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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 34( c) and 3 5( c), Appellants Karen White and Elkhorn, 
LLC (collectively "White") submit this Reply Brief in rebuttal to the arguments raised by 
Respondent Valley County. 
wilite incorporates its statement of the course of proceedings and facts in its opening brief 
here. TIns matter comes before this Court on a narrow legal issue framed by Judge Lodge in his 
Certified Question: 
Under Idaho law, when does the statute of limitations begin to run on a cause of 
action arising out of an allegedly illegal impact fee imposed by a local 
government entity as part of a land use application? 
Despite this very straightforward question to tIns Court, Respondent, Valley County (the "County"), 
goes to great lengths in its brief to persuade tills Court to ans\ver legal matters beyond the Certified 
Question and in one part of their brief the County completely disregards Judge Lodge's Order that 
denied one of its questions it sought to be certified and instead abuses this process to elicit an 
opinion from this Court with respect to exhausting administrative remedies. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Many of the County's Arguments and Issues Raised In The Respondent's Brief Are 
Not Properly Before This Court On Certified Question. 
The County has presented various arguments outside the scope of the Certified Question 
asking this Court to address whether: (1) Judge Lodge "assumed incorrectly that there are two 
distinct causes of action" [Respondent's Brief pg. 9] because inverse condemnation and illegal 
tax are the same thing; (2) \Vhite's case in untimely for failing to seek a Regulatory Takings 
Analysis within 28 days; (3) the statute of limitations period is 28 days; (4) White's case is 
untimely for failing to seek judicial review; (5) the exception to exhaustion of administrative 
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remedies do not apply in this case; and (6) the County could impose the impact fees independent 
of the requirements of IDIF A. None of those issues raised in the County's brief answer or 
address the limited issue presented on certified question to this Court and should therefore not be 
addressed in this Court's written decision because to do so would result in an advisory opinion. 
Courts of the United States may certify a controlling question of law in a pending action 
to this Court where there is no controlling precedent and the detennination would materially 
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation in the United States court. St. Luke's A1agic Valley 
Regional iv1edical Center v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 39-40, 293 P.3d 661,663-664 (20l3); LA.R. 
12.3(a). This Court in St. Luke's "~1agic Valley Regional Medical Center (issued January of this 
year) reiterated its role in answering a certified question: 
Id. 
When the "question presented is a narrow one," as it is here, "[o]ur role is limited 
to answering the certified question." Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho 
374, 375, 744 P.2d 102, 103 (1987) (cautioning that "to now decide [extraneous 
matters] would result in an advisory opinion on a question not certified"). If "the 
parties in their briefs and arguments before this Court present [ ] facts outside" the 
certification order, we consider "only those facts contained in the order." Kunz v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 902, 792 P.2d 926, 927 n. 1 (1990). 
In this case, Judge Lodge has only asked this Court to detennine "[u]nder Idaho law, 
when does the statute of limitations begin to run on a cause of action arising out of an allegedly 
illegal impact fee imposed by a local government entity as part of a land use application?" 
(underlining added). Judge Lodge did not ask this Court to opine whether he was correct in his 
holdings nor does the certified question ask this Court to opine on the merits ofthis case. Judge 
Lodge even specifically stated he was not asking this court to answer when the statute of 
limitations begins to run on an inverse condemnation claim, "This Court is not asking the Idaho 
Supreme Court to address the accrual date for inverse condemnation claims." (See Judge 
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Lodge's Certification Order, Dk. 151, p. 11) 1. Judge Lodge specifically held that this certified 
question is a narrow legal question before the Idaho Supreme Court. (See Judge Lodge's 
Cert~fzcation Order, Dk. 151, p. 21). Despite Judge Lodge's intent for certifying this limited 
question to this Court, the County takes this opportunity to discuss and argue matters outside the 
certified question, which is improper. 
For example, the County in Section III, of their brief discusses the accrual standard for 
inverse condemnation claims to the facts of this case and argues its position as it did on summary 
judgment that the statute of limitations for White's inverse condemnation claim ran at the time 
the CUP was issued. See Respondent's Brief pg. 26. Judge Lodge however has already decided 
that matter on summary judgment. Judge Lodge held that White was not "'fully aware' of the 
taking until her project manager on Phase 1, Mr. Findlay, received the final RDA with the 
requirement that $166,496 was due for proportional impact fees related to Phase 1." See. 
}vfemorandum Order (Docket No. 128, pp. 24-25); CR, pp. 960-961. The County's arguments on 
this issue provide no answer to the certified question, but rather attempt to get this Court to 
address the merits of the pending case before Judge Lodge. Those matters are outside the scope 
of the certified question and should be disregarded by this Court. 
In addition, the County also impermissibly attempts to get this Court to opine on legal 
questions that Judge Lodge specifically refused to certify to this Court. For example, the County 
reframes its failure to exhaust administrative remedies argument that White should have sought 
judicial review and having failed to do so, White's cause of action is barred. Judge Lodge's 
Order (Docket 152; CR pp. 1095-1102) specifically denied the County request to certify that 
question to this Court and yet the County asks this Court to include an analysis of that issue in 
1 Judge Lodge's Certification Order, dated August 10, 2012 [Docket No. 151], was not included in the electronic 
Clerk's Record, but is part of the pleadings on file with this Court. The Certification Order was filed with this Court 
on August 24, 2012. 
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this decision. See Respondent's Brief pg. 31. Based on the discussion above, Vvnite respectfully 
asks this Court to limit its decision to the certified question presented by Judge Lodge. 
B. The County Has Not Demonstrated \Vhy The Test For Accrual On Inverse 
Condemnation Should Apply To Illegal Impact Fees Imposed By A Local Government. 
The County argues that the test used for detennining accrual of an inverse condeillilation 
claim should be the same test for detennining when the statute of limitations runs when an 
impact fee is collected.2 The County has failed to explain why the 'substantial interference with 
plaintiffs property interest, became apparent' standard should apply to cases collecting illegal 
impact fees, since there is always a date certain when the impact fees are collected. 
This Court has held that the test for detennining when an inverse condeillilation action 
accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the 
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' 
property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 
1001,1005 (1979). In making that pronouncement, this Court recognized that the actual date of 
a taking, "is not readily susceptible to exact determination ... " Id. Which explains why the test 
was created in the first place. Takings claims can arise under various fact patterns and it is not 
always clear when the taking may have occurred. For example in Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 
79,644 P.2d 1333, 1338 (1982) this Court applied the Tibbs standard to an inverse condemnation 
claim involving a dairy farm whose land had become flooded by the Idaho Department of Fish 
and Game. The Reuth Court recognized that the gradual nature of the taking in that case (i.e. the 
rising water) would have been impossible to determine when the taking occurred and therefore 
2 The County argues that White's inverse condemnation claim and her illegal tax claim for failing to follow IDIFA 
are the same claim and therefore the accrual test for inverse condemnation is the same. As discussed above, 
whether a takings claim and a refund claim for collecting an illegal impact fee is the same' cause of action' is 
outside the scope of the certified question. White only addresses whether the accrual test applied to takings cases is 
appropriate for illegal impact fee cases. 
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the Court chose a date when the Department of Fish and Game removed boards from an 
irrigation check as the date when the plaintiff recognized the severity of the problem. Id. at 
Idaho 79. The Tibbs standard has likewise been used in subsequent takings cases where the date 
of taking was not clear. See e.g. l'yfcCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners, 128 Idaho 213, 
912 P.1d 100 (1996) (Tibbs test used to detennine that statute of limitations for takings claim 
started at time stop work order was issued); Harris v. State, ex rei. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 
210 P.3d 86 (2009) (Tibbs test used to detennine that statute of limitations for takings claim 
started at time plaintiff signed agreement promising to pay royalties and rents on minerals). 
In this case, the collection of money to pay an illegal impact fee does not suffer from the 
detennination challenges that a takings claim may have. There is a specific discernible date that 
impact fees are collected from the fee payer from which the start of the statute of limitations can 
be detennined. Once the money leaves the hands of the fee payer, she now has a cause of action 
to seek a refund within the four year statute of limitations set forth in I.e. § 5-224. As such, 
there is no need to adopt a 'made aware' standard as that first adopted in Tibbs to detennine 
when the statute of limitations begins on an illegal impact fee. 
C. This Court Should Adopt The Majority View Holding That A Cause Of Action For An 
Illegal Impact Fee Accrues At The Time The Impact Fee Is Paid. 
Adopting an accrual date of when the money was collected on a cause of action for a 
collection of an illegal impact fee provides certainty and accomplishes all of the purposes of a 
statute of limitations. The County in analyzing the out-of-state cases cited by White attempts to 
find distinctions or differences which, according to the County make those cases inapplicable to 
the answering the certified question. The County's analysis is wrong. 
The County first attempts to distinguish the decisions in Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County 
of DuPage, 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001), Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of La 
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Habra, 23 P.3d 601 (Cal. 2001), Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169 (R.!. 2000) by 
arguing that those holdings are distinguishable because the impact fees charged in those cases 
were either done pursuant to an ordinance or were not done pursuant to a land use approval as 
was done in Wllite's case. This is a distinction without legal significance. How the illegal 
impact fee or illegal tax was charged has no bearing on when the statute of limitations begins to 
run. Here, the certified question asks this Court to assume that there is an "allegedly illegal 
impact fee" and then asks when does the statute of limitations begin to run? The Sundance and 
Howard Jarvis decision both answer the question that the limitations period runs at the time the 
fee is collected. As discussed in Appellant's Brief these holding are the majority view and \Vhite 
respectfully asks this Court to adopt a similar holding. 
The County likewise attempts to discredit the holding in Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168 
S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005) (illegal fire registration fee accrued at time fee was collected) by 
arguing that Wl1ite's case is distinguishable because \\'hite's case involved a quid pro quo that 
Wllite pay impact fees in exchange for approval. The County once again impennissibly attempts 
to focus this Court on the issue of whether the conditioning of approval on the payment of an 
impact fee was valid or not. That question however is not before this Court. The Lowenburg 
decision is additional persuasive authority for this Court to adopt the majority view that the 
statute of limitations runs at the time the illegal impact fee is collected. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the analysis above, Wllite respectfully requests that this Court provide the 
answer to the certified question as: the statute of limitations begins to run on a cause of action 
arising out of an allegedly illegal impact fee imposed by a local government entity as part of a 
land use application at the time the illegal impact fee is paid. 
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DATED this 9th day of September, 2013. 
Borton Lakey Law Offices 
-
BYY~(~ 
Victor Villegas, the Frrm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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